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Sheffield S3 7QB, UKOur paper [1] compared two competing hypotheses. The hypothesis that we
label universalistic moral evaluation holds that a definitional feature of reasoning
about moral rules is that, ceteris paribus, judgements of violations of rules con-
cerning harm, rights or justice will be insensitive to spatial or temporal distance
or the opinions of authority figures. The hypothesis that we label moral parochi-
alism, consonant with a variety of theories of the evolutionary origins of
morality, holds that, because moral judgements primarily serve to navigate
local social arenas, remote events will not activate the mechanisms that generate
negative moral evaluation to the same extent as events occurring in the here
and now, whereas the consent of local authority figures will temper condemna-
tion. Hence, moral parochialism predicts that the collective output of the
faculties responsible for moral judgement will exhibit a reduction in the severity
of judgement as a function of spatial or temporal distance or the opinions of
local authority figures. We provided evidence from seven diverse societies,
including five small-scale societies, showing that such reductions in severity
judgements exist in all of the societies examined.
Piazza and Sousa [2] argue that our data do not support parochialism, and
instead support universalism, because
(1) Only a minority of our participants reversed their initial judgement of the wrong-
ness of an action (from wrong to not wrong or good) when it was
subsequently framed as having occurred long ago or far away, or as having
been sanctioned by authority figures.
(2) Our use of graduated moral judgements, rather than dichotomous
judgements, is inappropriate.
(3) Only a minority of our participants diminished the severity of their initial
judgement of the wrongness of an action when it was subsequently
framed as having occurred long ago or far away, or as having been
sanctioned by an important person.
These objections stem from misunderstandings of moral parochialism and the
evolutionary reasoning behind it.
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should necessarily be insensitive to wrongdoings distant in
space or time or to violations sanctioned by local authorities,
but rather that the collective output of the faculties respon-
sible for moral judgement will exhibit a reduction in the
severity of judgement as a result of such factors. As we expli-
citly noted, ‘remote events will not activate the evolved
mechanisms undergirding negative moral evaluation to the
same degree as actions that occur in the here and now. This
is not to say that actors should assess remote transgressions
as acceptable. Rather, remote events should simply trouble
actors less than immediate events, evoking weaker sentiments
and eliciting less overt condemnation.’
The heart of our thesis is a cost/benefit analysis wherein
the benefits of moral disapproval mainly derive from repu-
tation enhancement and the avoidance of higher-order
punishment, in addition to the cost/benefit ratios of addres-
sing harmful actions occurring at a distance or with the
consent of local authorities. Many factors will affect such
cost/benefit analyses; hence, whereas the primary benefits
of moral judgement accrue from judgements regarding local
matters, especially those concerning one’s ingroup, this
does not mean that moral judgement should not function at
all regarding more distant matters, merely that they should
be judged to be of less importance. Thus, moral parochialism
does not require that any participants ever reverse their judge-
ments from condemnation to neutrality or praise when
judgements concern matters spatially or temporally distant
or sanctioned by authorities—merely that condemnation
will tend to diminish. Whether or not, for a given transgres-
sion and a given participant, this diminution will reach the
point of indifference is an empirical question.
Sceptical that moral judgement is graded, Piazza and Sousa
argue that our five-point evaluative scale should be replaced
with a dichotomous wrong/not wrong categorization, and
thus that our analyses employing said scale are uninformative.
While both folk intuition and formal judicial systems around
the world suggest that moral judgement is indeed graded,
nevertheless, without accepting Piazza and Sousa’s premise,
we can settle the matter by conducting additional analyses,
asking whether the use of a dichotomous variable changes
our findings. We therefore recoded our five-point-scale
responses into two categories (‘bad’ and ‘extremely bad’¼ 0,
all other responses ¼ 1). Using the R package glmer2stan, we
fitted the data to a series of binomial general linear models,
using model comparison via deviance information criterion
weights to select the best models. Results, presented in tables
S1 and S9 in the electronic supplementary material, reveal
that a model encompassing all seven societies sampled clearly
displays evidence of moral parochialism. Examining each
society individually (see the electronic supplementary
material), in only one of the seven societies is parochialism
no longer supported. Hence, even after dichotomizing our
response variable per Piazza and Sousa’s objection—thereby
substantially reducing the resolution of our data—we still
observe strong evidence for moral parochialism.
Piazza and Sousa assert that moral parochialism fails
because a majority of participants in our sample did not
reduce their initial wrongness judgements when queried
regarding spatially or temporally distant events or authority
approval. Both their reasoning and their use of descriptive stat-
istics disregard key considerations. First, for many normative
reasons, participants can be expected to maintain the sameresponse across conditions. For example, cultural proscriptions
are usually not phrased in parochial terms, hence self-
presentation concerns can be expected to often lead to consist-
ency. Whatever the source of consistency, were parochialism
not a substantial factor in moral judgement, then changes
from the baseline judgement would not be patterned. Piazza
and Sousa’s table 2 thus fails to afford the crucial comparison,
namely the ratio between the fraction of participants who
decreased their condemnation and the fraction who increased
it. As evident in electronic supplementary material, table S17,
per moral parochialism, for the vast majority of such compari-
sons, far more participants decreased their condemnation than
increased it. Averaging across the societies sampled (see elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S18), in the authority
condition the percentage of participants who decreased their
condemnation is more than four times as large as the percen-
tage that increased it, whereas this percentage is more than
nine times larger in the temporal condition and more than
11 times larger in the spatial condition.
For at least three methodological reasons, our study prob-
ably underestimates the extent to which people reduce the
severity of their moral judgements in response to our manipu-
lations. First, our brief vignettes (terse by design, to facilitate
cross-cultural comparison), framed as hypothetical, are a far
cry from real moral transgressions committed, respectively,
either by known members of one’s community or anonymous
distant strangers. Given many sources of individual variation,
only the most sensitive individuals will respond to weak
stimuli. Accordingly, when using such stimuli, finding the pre-
dicted patterns in a substantial minority of participants across
diverse societies constitutes evidence in support of an evol-
utionary explanation. Our use of brief hypothetical vignettes
is thus akin to using rubber snakes to test for an evolutionarily
grounded fear of ancestrally relevant threats—if a quarter of
participants around the world were found to be frightened
by rubber snakes but not by frayed electrical cords, it would
be reasonable to conclude that fear of snakes derives from a
species-typical evolved psychology.
Second, our five-point scale—employed to capture
changes in degree while being accessible to participants unfa-
miliar with scales—may well have obscured substantial
variation in moral judgement, because it only offered two
grades of condemnation. A fine-grained scale may reveal
that many more participants shift their moral judgements
when evaluating remote transgressions or those sanctioned
by authorities. Similarly, because response options were
constrained, our results cannot illuminate issues of magni-
tude. While many factors may cause participants to alter
their responses across conditions, moral parochialism pre-
dicts that the magnitude of such changes should be greater
for changes that involve a reduction in condemnation relative
to those that involve an increase.
Third, our dependent measures—judgements communi-
cated to a researcher by pointing to a linear scale—were an
intentionally shallow, cross-culturally replicable simulation
of the sorts of community discussions that are the domain
of actual moral judgement. Our dependent measures differed
from real life in that they entailed few costs to participants.
Cost/benefit considerations are central to moral parochial-
ism, hence it is likely that investigations in which moral
judgements have more substantive consequences (e.g.
expending resources to penalize wrongdoers abroad versus
locally) will enhance the degree of parochialism observed.
rspb.royalsocietypublishin
3
 on July 4, 2016http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from In sum, Piazza and Sousa (i) attribute predictions to moral
parochialism that it does not entail; (ii) present descriptive
statistics that mask rather than reveal key features of the
patterns at issue; (iii) assert that analyses using graduated
moral judgements are misleading when, in actuality, employ-
ing dichotomous judgements produces essentially the same
results; and (iv) fail to appreciate methodological factors that
must be taken into account when assessing research conducted
across diverse societies. While Piazza and Sousa’s critique thusdoes little to undermine the evidence for moral parochialism,
nevertheless, it does constructively draw attention to variation
in moral judgement. Even after exploring the methodological
considerations discussed above, research is likely to reveal
substantial individual differences in moral parochialism,
possibly including a set of individuals who are staunchly
universalist. The evolutionary and ontogenetic sources of such
variation—including cultural differences, a pattern clearly
evident in our results—merit investigation. g.org
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